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Abstract—The total variation distance is proposed as a privacy
measure in an information disclosure scenario when the goal is to
reveal some information about available data in return of utility,
while retaining the privacy of certain sensitive latent variables
from the legitimate receiver. The total variation distance is
introduced as a measure of privacy-leakage by showing that: i) it
satisfies the post-processing and linkage inequalities, which makes
it consistent with an intuitive notion of a privacy measure; ii) the
optimal utility-privacy trade-off can be solved through a standard
linear program when total variation distance is employed as
the privacy measure; iii) it provides a bound on the privacy-
leakage measured by mutual information, maximal leakage, or
the improvement in an inference attack with a bounded cost
function.
Index Terms—Privacy, total variation distance, utility-privacy
trade-off
I. INTRODUCTION
We measure, store, and share an immense amount of data
about ourselves, from our vital signals to our energy consump-
tion profile. We often disclose these data in return of various
services, e.g., better health monitoring, a more reliable energy
grid, etc. However, with the advances in machine learning
techniques, the data we share can be used to infer more
accurate and detailed personal information, beyond what we
are willing to share. One solution to this problem is to develop
privacy-preserving data release mechanisms that can provide
a trade-off between the utility we receive and the information
we leak. Denoting the data to be released by random variable
Y , and the latent private variable as X , we apply a privacy-
preserving mapping on Y , whereby a distorted version of Y ,
denoted by U , is shared instead of Y . Typically, privacy and
utility are competing goals: The more distorted version of Y is
revealed, the less information can be inferred about X , while
the less utility can be obtained. As a result, there is a trade-off
between obtaining utility and leaking privacy.
Since privacy can be a concern in legal transactions of data,
it appears in different areas, where information is transferred
from a user to a legitimate receiver of information. For in-
stance, in database privacy [1]–[3], data is published publicly,
while preserving the privacy of individuals (identity, attributes,
etc.). Another example is privacy in smart grids [4]–[7], where
a smart meter measures and reports the power consumption of
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a user to the electricity provider to improve the reliability and
energy efficiency, and from this information, several private
features of the user, such as their usage patterns or daily life
habits, can be leaked.
The statistical view of privacy (information-theoretic,
estimation-theoretic, and so on) has gained increasing attention
recently [8]–[16]. For example, in [8], a general statistical
inference framework is proposed to capture the loss of privacy
in legitimate transactions of data. In [9], the privacy-utility
trade-off under the log-loss cost function is considered, called
the privacy funnel, which is closely related to the information
bottleneck introduced in [17]. In [10], [11], the privacy and
utility are expressed in terms of correctly guessing probabili-
ties. In [12], a generic privacy model is considered, where the
privacy mapping has access to a noisy observation W of the
pair (X,Y ). Different well-known privacy measures and their
characteristics are also investigated in [12].
We study the information-theoretic privacy in this paper. For
two probability mass function p, q on random variable X , the
total variation distance is defined as
δ
(
pX(·), qX(·)
)
, 1
2
‖p− q‖1, (1)
where p and q are the probability vectors corresponding to
probability mass functions (pmf) pX(·) and qX(·), respec-
tively. We measure the privacy-leakage (about the private
variable X by revealing U ) by the following average total
variation distance
T (X;U) , EU
[
δ
(
pX|U (·|U), pX(·)
)]
=
1
2
∑
u
pU (u)‖pX|u − pX‖1. (2)
Note that T is not symmetric, and we have T (X;U) = 0 iff
X and U are independent.
First, we characterize the optimal utility-privacy trade-
off under this privacy measure for three different utility
measures, namely mutual information, minimum mean-square
error (MMSE), and probability of error. Then, we motivate the
proposed privacy measure by showing that it satisfies both the
post-processing and linkage inequalities [12], and it provides
a bound on the leakage measured by mutual information,
maximal leakage, or the improvement in an inference attack
with an arbitrary bounded cost function as considered in [8].
Notations. Random variables are denoted by capital letters,
their realizations by lower case letters. Matrices and vectors
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are denoted by bold capital and bold lower case letters,
respectively. For integers m ≤ n, we have the discrete interval
[m : n] , {m,m+1, . . . , n}. For an integer n ≥ 1, 1n denotes
an n-dimensional all-one column vector. For a random variable
X ∈ X , with finite |X |, the probability simplex P(X ) is the
standard (|X | − 1)-simplex given by
P(X ) =
{
v ∈ R|X |
∣∣∣∣1T|X | · v = 1, vi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [1 : |X |]}.
Furthermore, to each pmf on X , denoted by pX(·), corre-
sponds a probability vector pX ∈ P(X ), whose i-th element
is pX(xi) (i ∈ [1 : |X |]). Likewise, for a pair of random
variables (X,Y ) with joint pmf pX,Y , the probability vector
pX|y corresponds to the conditional pmf pX|Y (·|y),∀y ∈ Y ,
and PX|Y is an |X |×|Y| matrix with columns pX|y,∀y ∈ Y .
FY (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
random variable Y . For 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, Hb(t) , −t log2 t− (1−
t) log2(1 − t) denotes the binary entropy function with the
convention 0 log 0 = 0. Throughout the paper, for a random
variable Y with the corresponding probability vector pY , the
entropies H(Y ) and H(pY ) are written interchangeably. For
x ∈ Rn and p ∈ [1,∞], the Lp-norm is defined as ‖x‖p ,
(
∑n
i=1 |xi|p)
1
p , p ∈ [1,∞), and ‖x‖∞ , maxi∈[1:n] |xi|. Let
p, q be two arbitrary pmfs on X . The Kullback–Leibler diver-
gence from q to p is defined as D(p||q) ,∑x p(x) log2(p(x)q(x) ).
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Consider a pair of random variables (X,Y ) ∈ X × Y
(|X |, |Y| < ∞) distributed according to the joint distribution
pX,Y . We assume that pY (y) > 0,∀y ∈ Y , and pX(x) >
0,∀x ∈ X , since otherwise the supports Y or/and X could
have been modified accordingly. Let Y denote the available
data to be released, while X denote the latent private data.
Assume that the privacy mapping/data release mechanism
takes Y as input and maps it to the released data denoted
by U . In this scenario, X −Y −U form a Markov chain, and
the privacy mapping is denoted by the conditional distribution
pU |Y . Let J(X;U) ∈ [0,+∞) be a generic privacy measure
as a functional of the joint distribution pX,U that captures
the amount of (information) leakage from X to U . Hence,
the smaller J(X;U) is, the higher privacy is achieved by the
mapping pU |Y . Also, let R(Y ;U) ∈ [0,+∞), a functional
of the joint distribution pY,U , denote an application-specific
quantity that measures the amount of utility/reward obtained
by disclosing U . Therefore, the utility-privacy trade-off can be
written as
sup
pU|Y :
X−Y−U
J(X;U)≤
R(Y ;U), (3)
where the task is to find a privacy mapping that maximizes the
utility, while guaranteeing a privacy-leakage up to the level .
Having pX|U (·|u) 6= pX(·) for some u ∈ U , makes the
private data potentially at risk. In other words, the adversary
may gain some information about the private data due to this
statistical dependence. Therefore, a measure of the distance
between the posterior and the prior distributions of the private
data can be adopted as a privacy measure. For example, the
mutual information, i.e., I(X;U), is the average Kullback-
Leibler distance from pX to pX|U , where the averaging is over
the realizations of U . In this paper, we use the average total
variation distance between pX|U (·|u) and pX(·) to measure
the privacy-leakage1 as in (2), i.e., J(X;U) = T (X;U). The
adoption of this privacy measure is justified in the subsequent
sections.
Throughout the paper, we will refer to three other privacy
measures, which are introduced next. The maximal leakage
[19] from X to U measures the mutiplicative gain, upon
observing U , of the probability of correctly guessing a ran-
domized function of X , maximized over all such randomized
functions. This is shown in [19, Theorem 1] to be equivalent
to
L(X → U) = log
∑
u∈U
max
x∈X
pX(x)>0
pU |X(u|x). (4)
In our definition of X , at the begining of this chapter, we
assumed that pX(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X . Hence, the condition
pX(x) > 0 can be dropped in the above definition.
The maximum information leakage, defined in [8] as
I∗(X;U) , H(X)−min
u∈U
H(X|U = u), (5)
measures the worst-case information leakage over all the
realizations of the released variable U .
The maximal α-leakage (Lmaxα (X → U)) is proposed in
[20] as a tunable measure for information leakage. The tuning
parameter α ranges from one to infinity, where at the extremes
of α = 1 and α = ∞, it boils down to mutual information
and maximal leakage, respectively.
III. THE OPTIMAL UTILITY-PRIVACY TRADE-OFF
In this section, we address the optimal utility-privacy trade-
off problem when privacy is measured by the average total
variation distance given in (2). We consider three different
utility measures, in particular, the mutual information, MMSE,
and error probability. The corresponding utility-privacy trade-
offs are defined as follows:
m(X,Y ) , maxpU|Y :
X−Y−U
T (X;U)≤
I(Y ;U), (6)
M(X,Y ) , minpU|Y :
X−Y−U
T (X;U)≤
E[(Y − U)2], (7)
E(X,Y ) , minpU|Y :
X−Y−U
T (X;U)≤
Pr{Y 6= U}. (8)
In the following theorem, we present the optimal utility-
privacy trade-off m(X,Y ) for the special case of binary Y ,
since i) it admits a closed-form solution, and ii) it can be
generalized to arbitrary finite Y .
Theorem 1. Let (X,Y ) ∈ X × {y1, y2} (|X | < ∞) with
pY (y1) = p and PX|Y =
[
pX|y1 pX|y2
]
|X |×2. We have
m(X,Y ) = min
{
1,

p(1− p)‖pX|y1 − pX|y2‖1
}
Hb(p),
(9)
1In [18], the maximum total variation distance, where the maximum is over
the realizations of U , is employed as the privacy-leakage measure.
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Proof. Let pY |U (y1|u) be denoted by qu,∀u ∈ U . We have
2T (X;U) =
∑
u
pU (u)‖pX|u − pX‖1
=
∑
u
pU (u)
∥∥∥∥PX|Y ([ qu1− qu
]
−
[
p
1− p
])∥∥∥∥
1
= ‖pX|y1 − pX|y2‖1
∑
u
pU (u)|qu − p|.
From the constraint T (X;U) ≤ , we obtain ∑u pU (u)|qu −
p| ≤ 2‖pX|y1−pX|y2‖1 . Denoting the right hand side (RHS) of
the above by η, m(X,Y ) is given by
m(X,Y ) = maxpU|Y :
X−Y−U
T (X;U)≤
I(Y ;U)
= H(Y )− min
pU|Y :
X−Y−U
T (X;U)≤
H(Y |U) (10)
= Hb(p)− min
pU (·),qu:∑
u pU (u)|qu−p|≤η,∑
u pU (u)qu=p
∑
u
pU (u)Hb(qu), (11)
where the equality in (11) follows from the fact the constraints
of minimization in (10) and (11) are equivalent.
In what follows, we show that in the minimization in (11),
there is no loss of optimality if instead of qu ∈ [0, 1], we
replace qu ∈ {0, p, 1}.
Assume that an arbitrary U that satisfies X−Y −U is given
with its corresponding values qu ∈ [0, 1],∀u ∈ U , that satisfies
the constraints of optimization, i.e.,
∑
u pU (u)|qu − p| ≤ η
and
∑
u pU (u)qu = p. Assume that there exists
2 u0 ∈ U ,
such that qu0 6∈ {0, p, 1}. Therefore, we have qu0 ∈ (0, p)
or qu0 ∈ (p, 1). In any case, qu0 can be written as a
convex combination of the extreme points of the segment it
belongs to. Assume that qu0 ∈ (p, 1). Hence, we can write
qu0 =
1−qu0
1−p × p +
qu0−p
1−p × 1. Construct the Markov chain
X − Y − U ′ as follows. Let U ′ , (U\{u0}) ∪ {uˆ0, u˜0}. Let,
pU ′(u) = pU (u),∀u ∈ U\{u0}, pU ′(uˆ0) = 1−qu01−p pU (u0), and
pU ′(u˜0) =
qu0−p
1−p pU (u0). Finally, let qu′ remain unchanged
for all the elements of U\{u0}, and quˆ0 = p, qu˜0 = 1. Due to
linearity, it can be readily verified that
∑
u′∈U ′ pU ′(u
′)|qu′ −
p| = ∑u pU (u)|qu − p| ≤ η and ∑u′∈U ′ pU ′(u′)qu′ =∑
u pU (u)qu = p. Hence, pU ′|Y is in the feasible region of
the optimization. Furthermore, from the concavity of entropy,
we have∑
u∈U
pU (u)Hb(qu) =
∑
u∈U\{u0}
pU (u)Hb(qu) + pU (u0)Hb(qu0)
=
∑
u∈U\{u0}
pU (u)Hb(qu)
+ pU (u0)Hb(
1− qu0
1− p × p+
qu0 − p
1− p × 1)
2if not, there is nothing to prove.
≥
∑
u∈U\{u0}
pU (u)Hb(qu) + pU ′(uˆ0)Hb(quˆ0)
+ pU ′(u˜0)Hb(qu˜0)
=
∑
u′∈U ′
pU ′(u
′)Hb(qu′)
Therefore, the performance of the privacy mapping pU ′|Y is
at least as good as3 that of pU |Y . Therefore, without loss
of optimality, the constraint qu ∈ (1, p) can be replaced
by qu ∈ {p, 1}. In a similar way, qu ∈ (0, p) can be
replaced by qu ∈ {0, p}, which results in the sufficiency
of qu ∈ {0, p, 1}. Therefore, setting U = {u1, u2, u3} in
direct correspondence to {0, p, 1}, the problem resuces to the
following linear program
max
pU (·):
pU (u1)p+pU (u3)(1−p)≤η
pU (u2)p+pU (u3)=p
(1− pU (u2))Hb(p),
which can be readily found to be equal to min
{
1, η2p(1−p)
}
·
Hb(p). Replacing η with 2‖pX|y1−pX|y2‖1
results in (9).
Remark 1. The proof of Theorem 1 relies on a simple
fact: the minimum of a concave function over a convex set is
attained at an extreme point of that set.
The following theorem, whose proof is provided in Ap-
pendix A, generalizes Theorem 1 and relies on the concav-
ity/convexity of the objective function and piece-wise linearity
of the L1-norm.
Theorem 2. For a pair of random variables (X,Y ) ∈ X×Y
(|X |, |Y| < ∞), m(X,Y ),M(X,Y ) and E(X,Y ) are the
solutions to a standard linear program (LP).
IV. MOTIVATION OF TOTAL VARIATION DISTANCE AS A
MEASURE OF PRIVACY
The following three subsections motivate the use of total
variation distance as a measure of privacy.
A. Post-processing and linkage inequalities
For an arbitrary privacy-leakage measure J(X;U), we have
the following definitions from [12].
Definition 1. (Post-processing inequality) J satisfies the
post-processing inequality if and only if for any Markov chain
A−B − C, we have J(A;B) ≥ J(A;C).
Definition 2. (Linkage inequality) J satisfies the linkage
inequality if and only if for any Markov chain A − B − C,
we have J(B;C) ≥ J(A;C).
It is obvious that for a symmetric privacy measure, i.e.,
J(X;U) = J(U ;X), like mutual information, the two defini-
tions are equivalent. As mentioned in [12], the post-processing
inequality captures an intuitive axiomatic requirement that
no independent post-processing of the data can increase the
privacy-leakage. On the other hand, the linkage inequality
states that if we have primary and secondary sensitive data
(B and A, respectively), and the released data C is generated
3Note that entropy is strictly concave, and pU′|Y outperforms pU|Y .
Nevertheless, what is sufficient in this analysis is just concavity.
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independently from only the primary sensitive data, then the
privacy-leakage of the secondary data is bounded by that of
the primary data. As an additional note, it is shown in [12] that
not all of the privacy measures satisfy the linkage inequality,
e.g., differential privacy or maximal information leakage4.
Theorem 3. The privacy measure T (·; ·) given in (2)
satisfies both the post-processing and the linkage inequalities.
Proof. Let A−B − C form a Markov chain. We have
2T (A;B) =
∑
b
pB(b)‖pA|b − pA‖1
=
∑
b,c
pB,C(b, c)‖pA|b,c − pA‖1 (12)
=
∑
c
pC(c)
∑
b
pB|C(b|c)‖pA|b,c − pA‖1
≥
∑
c
pC(c)
∥∥∥∥∑
b
pB|C(b|c)pA|b,c − pA
∥∥∥∥
1
(13)
=
∑
c
pC(c)‖pA|c − pA‖1
= 2T (A;C), (14)
where (12) follows from the fact that A−B−C form a Markov
chain; (13) results from the convexity of the L1-norm. This
proves the post-processing inequality.
In order to prove that T (·; ·), given in (2), satisfies the
linkage inequality, we can write
2T (A;C) =
∑
c
pC(c)‖pA|c − pA‖1
=
∑
c
pC(c)‖PA|B(pB|c − pB)‖1
=
∑
c
pC(c)
∑
a
∣∣∣∣∑
b
pA|B(a|b)
(
pB|C(b|c)− pB(b)
)∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
c
pC(c)
∑
a
∑
b
pA|B(a|b)|pB|C(b|c)− pB(b)| (15)
=
∑
c
pC(c)
∑
b
∑
a
pA|B(a|b)|pB|C(b|c)− pB(b)|
=
∑
c
pC(c)‖pB|c − pB‖1
= 2T (B;C), (16)
where (15) follows from the triangle inequality.
Remark 2. Among all the Lp-norms (p ≥ 1), only the L1-
norm satisfies the linkage inequality. Consider the following
4One of the advantages of satisfying the linkage inequality is as follows.
Consider the same scenario X−Y −U , where the distribution of the private
data X is unknown, or complex to learn. If we can find X′ satisfying X −
X′ − Y − U whose distribution is known or at least easily learnable, then
satisfying the linkage inequality is beneficial in the sense that by keeping the
privacy of X′, privacy of X is preserved, i.e., J(X;U) ≤ J(X′;U) ≤ .
This is simply a case of having layers of private information. Also, consider
the case where the privacy of any private latent variable X that satisfies
X − Y −U should be preserved by the release mechanism. Then, if linkage
inequality is satisfied, the solution would simply be J(Y ;U) ≤ .
𝑝"𝑝#
𝑝$
𝑝%
𝑝&𝑝'
11
11
1
0.50.5
𝐴 𝐵
Fig. 1: The example in Remark 2.
example: Let A−B −C form a Markov chain, and consider
the transition matrix
PA|B =
1 1 12 0 0 00 0 12 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
as shown in Figure 1 with pB =[
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6
]T
, where pi ∈ (0, 1),∀i ∈ [1 : 6]
and
∑6
i=1 pi = 1. Let C ∈ {−1, 1}, and
pC(1) =
1
2 . For sufficiently small δ > 0, let pB|c =[
p1 + cδ p2 + cδ p3 p4 − cδ p5 − cδ p6
]T
which
results in pA|c =
[
p7 + 2cδ p8 − 2cδ p6
]T
,∀c ∈ {−1, 1}.
It can be verified that for any p ∈ (1,+∞], we have
‖pA|c − pA‖p > ‖pB|c − pB‖p,∀c ∈ {−1, 1}.
Note that the quantity ‖x‖p = (
∑
i |xi|p)
1
p is not sub-
additive when p ∈ (0, 1), and thus, does not define a
norm. Nonetheless, even if the privacy measure is defined as
J(A;B) =
∑
b pB(b)‖pA|b − pA‖p with p ∈ (0, 1), it can
be verified that it does not satisfy the linkage inequality by
letting pB|c =
[
p1 p2 p3 + cδ p4 p5 p6 − cδ
]T
,∀c ∈
{−1, 1}, in the counterexample of this remark.
Remark 3. It is obvious that from the post-processing
inequality, the feasible range of  can be tightened to
[0, T (X;Y )].
B. Bounding inference threats
An inference threat model is introduced in [8], which
models a broad class of statistical inference attacks that can
be performed on private data X . Assume that an inference
cost function C(·, ·) : X × P(X ) → R is given. Prior
to observing U , the attacker chooses a belief distribution q
over X as the solution of c∗0 = minq∈P(X )EX [C(X,q)],
where the minimizer is denoted by q∗0, while after observing
U = u, he revises this belief as the solution of c∗u =
minq∈P(X )EX|U [C(X,q)|U = u], where the minimizer is
denoted by q∗u. As a result, the attacker obtains an average
gain in inference cost of ∆C = c∗0−EU [c∗U ], which quantifies
the improvement in his inference. A natural way to restrict the
attacker’s inference quality is to keep ∆C below a target value.
The following theorem ensures that for any bounded cost
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function C(·, ·), the attacker’s inference quality is restricted in
this way by focusing on the control of T (X;U), i.e., keeping
it below a certain threshold.
Theorem 4. Let L = supx∈X ,q∈P(X ) |C(x,q)| < +∞. We
have ∆C ≤ 4L · T (X;U).
Proof. The proof follows similar steps as in [9, Lemma 2] up
to the point of using Pinsker inequality, which is restated here.
∆C = c∗0 − EU [c∗U ]
= EX [C(X,q
∗
0)]− EU
[
EX|U [C(X,q∗U )|U = u]
]
= EU
[
EX|U [C(X,q∗0)− C(X,q∗U )|U = u]
]
= EU
[
EX|U [C(X,q∗0)− C(X,q∗U )|U = u]
− EX [C(X,q∗0)− C(X,q∗U )]
+ EX [C(X,q
∗
0)− C(X,q∗U )]
]
≤ EU
[∑
x
(pX|U (x|U)− pX(x))(C(x,q∗0)− C(x,q∗U ))
]
(17)
≤ EU
[
2L
∑
x
|pX|U (x|U)− pX(x)|
]
(18)
= 4L · T (X;U), (19)
where (17) follows from the fact that q∗0 is the minimizer
of EX [C(X,q)] over P(X ), and therefore, EX [C(X,q∗0) −
C(X,q∗u)] ≤ 0; in (18), the assumption |C(·, ·)| ≤ L has been
used.
In the following theorem, it is shown that the privacy
measure proposed in this paper, i.e., T (X;U), can serve as
lower and upper bounds for mutual information and maximal
leakage.
Theorem 5. The following upper and lower bounds hold.
I(X;U) ≥ 2 log2 e · T 2(X;U) (20)
L(X → U) ≤ log
(
1 +
T (X;U)
minx pX(x)
)
(21)
L(X → U) ≥ log
(
1 +
T (X;U)
(|X | − 1) maxx pX(x)
)
(22)
The proof of this Theorem is provided in Appendix C.
Remark 4. It is known from [20] that I(X;U) ≤
Lmaxα (X → U) ≤ L(X → U). Therefore, combined with
the bounds in Theorem 5, we can write
2 log2 e · T 2(X;U) ≤ I(X;U)
≤ Lmaxα (X → U)
≤ L(X → U)
≤ log
(
1 +
T (X;U)
minx pX(x)
)
. (23)
Remark 5. It is important to note that, in bounding the
inference gain of an adversary by T (X;U) (as in the beginning
of this subsection), the boundedness of the cost function is
not a necessary condition. For example, the log-loss cost
function, i.e., C(x,q) = − log q(x), where q(·) is the pmf
corresponding to q, is not a bounded cost function. However,
∆C under log-loss cost function, which is equal to I(X;U),
is bounded above by T (X;U) as in (23).
Remark 6. It is interesting to note that as a by-product of
the lower bound in (20) and Theorem 1, we can get non-trivial
bounds for the following quantity
g(X,Y ) = max
U :X−Y−U
I(X;U)≤
I(Y ;U),
which is the utility-privacy trade-off when mutual information
is employed as both the utility and privacy measure [21]. From
[15, Lemma 1], we have
H(Y )
I(X;Y )
 ≤ g(X,Y ) ≤ +H(Y |X),  ∈ [0, I(X;Y )].
(24)
The upper and lower bounds are two lines shown in Figure
2. Assume that Y is binary with pY (y1) = p, and X is
an arbitrary discrete random variable. Assume that instead
of I(X;U), we use its lower bound in Theorem 5, i.e.,
2 log2 e · T 2(X;U). Hence, by weakening the constraint, we
have an upper bound for the objective function as
g(X,Y ) ≤ max
U :X−Y−U
T (X;U)≤√ 2 log2 e
I(Y ;U)
= min
1,
√

2 log2 e
p(1− p)‖pX|y1 − pX|y2‖1
Hb(p),
(25)
which follows from Theorem 1. Figure 2 shows the upper
bound of (25), along with the two straight lines denoting the
upper and lower bounds in (24) for the following example:
(X,Y ) ∈ X ×Y , where X = {x1, x2, x3} and Y = {y1, y2}.
PX|Y =
0.5 0.30.3 0.2
0.2 0.5
 , pY = [ 132
3
]
As it can be seen, this is a non-trivial bound that has further
tightened the permissible region for the utility-privacy trade-
off.
C. Evaluation of the optimal utility-privacy trade-off
As shown in this paper, the optimal utility-privacy trade-offs
in (6) to (8) reduce to an LP when T (X;U) is employed as the
privacy measure. This result follows from the concavity of the
objective functions and piece-wise linearity of the L1-norm5.
Examples of these trade-off regions are provided in Section
V for different utility measures. Other measures of privacy
do not necessarily lend themselves to exact characterization.
For example, when mutual information is considered as both
the privacy and utility measures, the characterization of the
optimal trade-off (g(X;Y ) in [21]) is an open problem.
Another example is the trade-off when χ2-based information
measures capture both utility and privacy, for which upper and
5This is also the case in the more general observation model in [12], i.e.,
for the Markov chain (X,Y )−W − U .
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0
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Fig. 2: Tightening the permissible region of the utility-privacy
trade-off by employing T (X;U).
lower bounds are proposed in [22], and for a special case, a
convex program is developed to solve the trade-off. The fact
that the exact utility-privacy trade-off under T (X;U) can be
solved is not only important on its own, but also benefical
in bounding the trade-offs under other privacy measures, as
mentioned in Remark 6.
Remark 7. We emphasize here that the analysis in this paper
relies on the fact that the joint distribution of the private and
available data are known and can be fed as an input to the
release mechanism, as in [1] and [8]. In practice, the true data
distribution may not always be available, and therefore, further
analysis based on learning methods is needed to address the
utility-privacy trade-off. In this regard, [14], [16], [23] propose
a training method based on the application of Generative
Adversarial Networks (GAN) framework [24], which can be
captured as a minimax game between two parties, as a data-
driven approach to address this problem. As a related work,
[25] analyzes the performance of privacy-preserving release
mechanisms under partial knowledge of the input distribution
for different privacy measures. It is important to note that the
proposed privacy measure, i.e., T (·; ·) guarantees pointwise
and uniform privacy according to [25, Theorems 1,2]. An
extension of the current work is to address the utility-privacy
trade-off under the privacy measure T (X;U) when only a
limited number of observed data samples are available to the
release mechanism.
Remark 8. It is interesting to note that full knowledge of
the joint distribution pX,Y , is not necessary for the privacy-
preserving release mechanism under our proposed privacy
measure T (X;U). For instance, according to Theorem 1,
the privacy-preserving release mechanism has to know the
joint distribution PX,Y only through two quantities pY (y1)
and ‖pX|y1 − pX|y2‖1, rather than 2|X | − 1 quantities that
fully capture the joint distribution. In this regard, another
interesting problem is to evaluate the minimum amount of
information that is needed by the release mechanism.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here, we provide some numerical examples for the optimal
utility-privacy trade-off under total variation distance as the
𝑋 𝑌 13
13
13
13
13
23
23
1313
13
13
13
13
Fig. 3: An example joint distribution pX,Y , where pX = pY =
[ 13
1
3
1
3 ]
T , and pX|Y is according to the figure.
0 0.1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Fig. 4: The optimal utility-privacy trade-off regions.
privacy measure. Assume that the pair (X,Y ) is distributed
according to the joint distribution given in Figure 3. Figure
4 captures the trade-offs in (6) to (8). In the evaluation of
M(X,Y ), we have assumed Y = {y1, y2, y3} = {1, 0,−1}.
In the evaluation of the utility-privacy trade-off, the LP
can be solved by simplex method, which has polynomial-time
average-case complexity, however, as it can be observed in the
proof of Theorem 2, we need to check at most 2|X | regions
in P(Y) based on the sign of |X | elements of the L1-norm,
which grows exponentially with |X |. However, it is important
to note that this is the worst case, as for example, no matter
how large |X | is, we have only two regions when Y is binary.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced and motivated total variation distance as
an information-theoretic privacy-leakage measure by showing
that i) it satisfies the post-processing and linkage inequalities;
ii) the corresponding optimal utility-privacy trade-off can be
solved through a standard linear program; and iii) it provides
a bound on the privacy-leakage measured by the mutual
information, the maximal leakage, or the improvement in an
inference attack with a bounded cost function.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let ψ(·) be a continuous and concave functional defined on
P(Y). The following Proposition serves a the main part of
this proof.
Proposition 1. In the following optimization problem
min
FU (·), pY |u∈P(Y):
1
2
∫
U ‖pX|u−pX‖1dF (u)≤∫
U pY |udF (u)=pY
∫
ψ(pY |u)dFU (u), (26)
it is sufficient to have |U| ≤ |Y| + 1, and the solution is
obtained by a linear program.
Proof. For all x ∈ P(Y), consider the following quantity
f(x) , ‖PX|Y (x− pY )‖1 =
|X |∑
i=1
|ri(x− pY )|, (27)
where ri denotes the i-th row of matrix PX|Y . Based on where
x is located on P(Y), each argument in the absolute value in
(27), can be negative or non-negative. Hence, the quantity in
(27) divides P(Y) into at most 2|X | partitions, i.e., P(Y) =
∪Ki=1Si, where K ≤ 2|X |. It can be readily verified that each
Si is a convex polytope with a finite number of extreme points
( since it can be written as the intersection of a finite number
of closed half-spaces in P(Y)) and for x ∈ Si, f(x) is linear
in x. Let Sˆi denote the set of extreme points of Si, and S ,
∪Ki=1Sˆi. In the minimization in (26), it is sufficient to replace
pY |u ∈ P(Y) with pY |u ∈ S. This is simply a generalization
of the proof of Theorem 1, and relies on the concavity of ψ(·)
and linearity of f(·) over any Si. In other words, any pY |u
can be written as a convex combination of the extreme points
of the set it belongs to (i.e., Si for some i ∈ [1 : K]), while
preserving the constraint of optimization and not increasing
the objective function. When the objective function is strictly
concave, this procedure decreases the objective function.
Once the elements of S = {s1, s2, . . . , sK} are identified,
the problem in (26) reduces to
min
pU (·):
1
2
∑K
i=1 pU (ui)‖PX|Y (si−pX)‖1≤∑K
i=1 pU (ui)si=pY
K∑
i=1
pU (ui)ψ(si), (28)
which is a linear program. It can be verified that the constraint∑K
i=1 pU (ui) = 1 is satisfied if the second constraint in the
LP, i.e.,
∑K
i=1 pU (ui)si = pY is met. Finally, the procedure
of finding the elements of S is provided in Appendix D.
Showing |U| ≤ |Y| + 1 follows the routine application of
cardinality bounding techniques (e.g. [15]) as follows. Let c :
P(Y)→ R|Y|+1 be a vector-valued mapping defined element-
wise as
ci(pY |U (·|u)) = pY |U (yi|u), i ∈ [1 : |Y| − 1]
c|Y|(pY |U (·|u)) = ψ(pY |u),
c|Y|+1(pY |U (·|u)) = 1
2
‖PX|Y (pY |u − pY )‖1
Since P(Y) is a closed and bounded subset of R|Y|, it is
compact. Also, c is a continuous mapping. Therefore, from the
support lemma [26], for every U ∼ F (u) defined on (arbitrary)
U , there exists a random variable U ′ ∼ p(u′) with |U ′| ≤ |Y|
and a collection of conditional pmfs pY |U ′(·|u′) indexed by
u′ ∈ U ′, such that∫
U
ci(p(y|u))dF (u) =
∑
u′∈U ′
ci(p(y|u′))p(u′), i ∈ [1 : |Y|].
Therefore, there is no loss of optimality in considering |U| ≤
|Y|+ 1.
The utility-privacy trade-off in (6) can be rewritten as
m(X,Y ) = H(Y )− min
pU (·),pY |u:
T (X;U)≤∑
u pU (u)pY |u=pY
H(Y |U), (29)
and since H(·) is a concave function, from (26), it reduces to
m(X,Y ) = H(Y )− min
w≥0:[
f(s1) f(s2) . . . f(sK)
]
·w≤2[
s1 s2 . . . sK
]
·w=pY
[
H(s1) H(s2) . . . H(sK)
] ·w.
(30)
For the evaluation of the utility-privacy trade-off in (7), we
can write
EU,Y [(Y − U)2] = EU
[
EY |U [(Y − U)2|U ]
]
≥ EU
[
EY |U
[
(Y − E[Y |U ])2|U] ] (31)
=
∫
Var[Y |U = u]dFU (u), (32)
where (31) is a classical result from MMSE estimation [27].
From (32) and (7), we have the following lower bound:
M(X,Y ) ≥ min
FU (·), pY |u:
T (X;U)≤∫
U pY |udF (u)=pY
∫
Var[Y |U = u]dFU (u),
(33)
which is tight if and only if E[Y |U = u] = u,∀u ∈ U .
Proposition 2. Var[Y |U = u] is a concave function of pY |u.
The proof of this Proposition is provided in Appendix B.
From the concavity of Var[Y |U = u] in Proposition 2, we can
use the result of Proposition 1 and write
M(X,Y ) = min
w≥0:[
f(s1) f(s2) . . . f(sK)
]
·w≤2[
s1 s2 . . . sK
]
·w=pY
[
Var1 Var2 . . . VarK
] ·w, (34)
where Vari (∀i ∈ [1 : K]) denotes Var[Y |U = u] under si,
i.e., when pY |u = si. Finally, once the LP in (34) is solved,
if w∗i 6= 0 (i ∈ [1 : K]), we set ui = E[Y |U = ui], where the
expectation is taken over the distribution pY |ui = si.
Finally, similarly to Theorem 1, it can be verified that when
Y is binary, the problem in (7) has a closed form solution given
by
M(X,Y ) =
(
p(1− p)− ‖pX|y1 − pX|y2‖1
)+
· (y1− y2)2,
(35)
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where (x)+ , max{0, x}.
For the evaluation of the utility-privacy trade-off in (8), we
can write
Pr{Y 6= U} = 1− Pr{Y = U}
= 1−
∫
U
Pr{Y = u|U = u}dFU (u)
≥ 1−
∫
U
max
y
pY |U (y|u)dFU (u), (36)
where (36) holds with equality when u =
arg maxy pY |U (y|u). Then, (8) is lower bounded by
1 + min
FU (·), pY |u:
T (X;U)≤∫
U pY |udF (u)=pY
∫
U
−max
y
pY |U (y|u)dFU (u). (37)
For any two arbitrary pmfs p1Y (·) and p2Y (·), we have
max
y
{αp1Y (y) + (1− α)p2Y (y)}
≤ max
y
αp1Y (y) + max
y
(1− α)p2Y (y)
= αmax
y
p1Y (y) + (1− α) max
y
p2Y (y),
which results in −maxy pY (y) being a concave functional of
pY (·). Hence, following Proposition 1, the problem reduces to
E(X,Y ) = 1+ min
w≥0:[
f(s1) f(s2) . . . f(sK)
]
·w≤2[
s1 s2 . . . sK
]
·w=pY
− [sm1 sm2 . . . smK ] ·w,
(38)
where smi is the maximum element of the vector si, i ∈ [1 :
K]. Once the LP is solved, if w∗i 6= 0 (i ∈ [1 : K]), the value
of ui is set as the maximum element of the probability vector
pY |ui = si.
Similarly to Theorem 1, it can be verified that when Y is
binary, the problem in (8) has a closed form solution given by
E(X,Y ) = min{p, 1− p}
(
1− 
p(1− p)‖pX|y1 − pX|y2‖1
)+
.
(39)
APPENDIX B
Let pY |u be given as pY |u = λpY |u1 +(1−λ)pY |u2 , where
λ ∈ [0, 1]. It is obvious that for an arbitrary function b(·),
E[b(Y )|U = u] = λE[b(Y )|U = u1]+(1−λ)E[b(Y )|U = u2].
(40)
Therefore,
Var[Y |U = u] = E
[(
Y − E[Y |U = u]
)2∣∣∣∣U = u]
= E[Y 2|U = u]−
(
E[Y |U = u]
)2
= λE[Y 2|U = u1] + (1− λ)E[Y 2|U = u2]
−
(
λE[Y |U = u1] + (1− λ)E[Y |U = u2]
)2
(41)
≥ λE[Y 2|U = u1] + (1− λ)E[Y 2|U = u2]
− λ
(
E[Y |U = u1]
)2
− (1− λ)
(
E[Y |U = u2]
)2
(42)
= λE
[(
Y − E[Y |U = u1]
)2∣∣∣∣U = u1]
+ (1− λ)E
[(
Y − E[Y |U = u2]
)2∣∣∣∣U = u2]
= λVar[Y |U = u1] + (1− λ)Var[Y |U = u2],
where (41) follows from (40); and (42) is due to the convexity
of x2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We have
I(X;U) = EU [D(pX|U (·|U)||pX(·))]
≥ EU [2 log2 e · δ2(pX|U (·|U), pX(·))] (43)
≥ 2 log2 e
(
EU [δ(pX|U (·|U), pX(·))]
)2
(44)
= 2 log2 e · T 2(X;U),
where (43) comes from the application of Pinsker’s inequality,
and (44) follows from the convexity of x2 in x and Jensen’s
inequality.
For (21), we proceed as follows. From (4) and its following
explanation on X , maximal leakage can be rewritten as
L(X → U) = log
∑
u∈U
pU (u) max
x
pX|U (x|u)
pX(x)
(45)
For an arbitrary pmf qX(·) on X , it can be verified that 6
qX(x) ≤ pX(x) + 1
2
‖qX − pX‖1, ∀x ∈ X . (46)
6This can be proved by contradiction. Assume that ∃x0 ∈ X such that
(46) does not hold. As a result
qX(x0)− pX(x0) >
∑
x6=x0
|qX(x)− pX(x)|
≥
∑
x6=x0
pX(x)− qX(x)
= qX(x0)− pX(x0),
which is a contradiction.
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Therefore,
max
x
qX(x)
pX(x)
≤ max
x
pX(x) +
1
2‖qX − pX‖1
pX(x)
(47)
=
minx pX(x) +
1
2‖qX − pX‖1
minx pX(x)
, (48)
where (47) follows from (46), and (48) from the fact that for
a, t > 0, t+at is strictly decreasing in t. Replacing qX(·) with
pX|U (·|u) in (47) and (48), and plugging the result into (45)
results in (21).
The inequality in (22) is proved as follows. Let ∆x ,
qX(x) − pX(x), ∀x ∈ X . Hence, we have
∑
x∈X ∆x = 0.
Define
X+ , {x ∈ X |∆x ≥ 0}, X− , X\X+.
Therefore, we can write
max
x
qX(x)
pX(x)
= max
x
pX(x) + ∆x
pX(x)
= 1 + max
x∈X+
∆x
pX(x)
(49)
≥ 1 + maxx∈X+ ∆x
maxx∈X pX(x)
≥ 1 +
1
2‖qX − pX‖1
|X+|maxx∈X pX(x) (50)
≥ 1 +
1
2‖qX − pX‖1
(|X | − 1) maxx∈X pX(x) , (51)
where (49) follows from the definition of X+; (50) follows
from the fact that∑
x∈X+
∆x =
1
2
‖qX − pX‖1,
and the maximum values for ∆x is minimized when all of
them are equal. When qX = pX , (51) is obvious, and when
qX 6= pX , we have |X+| < |X |, and (51) holds. Finally,
Replacing qX(·) with pX|U (·|u), and using (45) results in (22).
APPENDIX D
The procedure of finding the elements of S is as follows.
We can write Si = {x ∈ R|Y||A˜ix ≤ bi,1T|Y| ·x = 1,x ≥ 0}.
Matrix A˜i has |Y| columns and at least two (at most |X |) rows
that correspond to the sign determination of the elements in
the L1-norm. The extreme points of Si are obtained from the
basic feasible solutions (see [28], [29]) of their corresponding
set denoted by Di = {x ∈ R|Y|′ |Aix = bi,x ≥ 0}. These
corresponding sets are obtained by adding slack variables to
change the inequality constraints of Si into equality. Matrix Ai
has at most |X |+ 1 rows (taking into account 1T|Y| · x = 1).
The procedure of finding the basic feasible solutions of Di
is as follows. Let ri denote the number of rows in Ai. Pick
a set B ⊂ [1 : |Y|′] of indices that correspond to ri linearly
independent columns of matrix Ai. There are at most
(|Y|′
ri
)
ways of choosing ri linearly independent columns of Ai. Let
AB be an ri × ri matrix whose columns are the columns
of Ai indexed by the indices in B. Also, for any x ∈ D,
let x˜ =
[
xTB x
T
N
]T
, where xB and xN are ri-dimensional
and (|Y|′ − ri)-dimensional vectors whose elements are the
elements of x indexed by the indices in B and [1 : |Y|′]\B,
respectively.
For any basic feasible solution x∗, there exists a set B ⊂ [1 :
|Y|′] of indices that correspond to a set of linearly independent
columns of Ai, such that the corresponding vector of x∗, i.e.,
x˜∗ =
[
x∗B
T x∗N
T
]T
, satisfies the following
x∗N = 0, x
∗
B = A
−1
B b, x
∗
B ≥ 0.
On the other hand, for any set B ⊂ [1 : |Y|′] of indices that
correspond to a set of linearly independent columns of Ai, if
A−1B b ≥ 0, then
[
A−1B b
0
]
is the corresponding vector of a
basic feasible solution. Hence, the basic feasible solutions of
Di can be obtained in this way.
As an example consider the joint distribution shown in
Figure 3, where pX = pY =
[
1
3
1
3
1
3
]T
and the elements
of the transition matrix PX|Y are shown in the figure. From
(27), we have
f(x) =
1
2
‖PX|Y (x− pY ) ‖1
=
1
3
(
|2x1 + x2 − 1|+ |x2 + 2x3 − 1|
)
The sign determination of the absolute value terms results in
the four possible regions given by
Si = {x ∈ R3|A˜ix ≤ bi,1T3 · x = 1,x ≥ 0},∀i ∈ [1 : 4],
(52)
where
A˜1 =
[−2 −1 0
0 −1 −2
]
,b1 =
[−1
−1
]
, A˜2 =
[
2 1 0
0 1 2
]
,
b2 =
[
1
1
]
, A˜3 =
[−2 −1 0
0 1 2
]
,b3 =
[−1
1
]
,
A˜4 =
[
2 1 0
0 −1 −2
]
,b4 =
[
1
−1
]
.
In order to find the extreme points of S1, we need to introduce
the slack variables x4, x5 ≥ 0 to change the two inequality
constraints of S1 into equality. As a result, we have the
following set
D1 =
{
x ∈ R5
∣∣∣∣A1x = b1,x ≥ 0},
where
A1 =
−2 −1 0 1 00 −1 −2 0 1
1 1 1 0 0
 ,b1 =
11
1

In order to obtain the basic feasible solutions of D1,
we observe that there are at most
(
5
3
)
ways of choos-
ing 3 linearly independent columns of A1. Exclud-
ing the index set {1, 2, 3}, as the columns corre-
sponding to this index set are linearly dependent, B
can be any of {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5},
{2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {2, 4, 5}, and {3, 4, 5}. By obtaining the
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values of xB = A−11B b1 corresponding to these 9 possibil-
ities, and checking their feasibility condition xB ≥ 0, we
conclude7 that the extreme points of S1 are
[
0 1 0
]T
and[
1
2 0
1
2
]T
. In a similar way, the extreme points of the
regions S2 to S4 can be obtained.
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